It was a 17-second incursion into Turkish airspace by a Russian bomber that almost turned the Syrian war into a global confrontation. By no stretch of the imagination could the Russian Su-24’s flight across a finger of territory jutting into Syria be considered a sign of impending attack on Turkey. Even the flight path revealed by the Turkish air forces suggests only two possibilities – carelessness with map reading or provocative arrogance.
On these slim justifications, but after repeated warnings that even the slightest encroachment would result in a military response, the Turkish air force shot the plane down. This could have provoked something that never happened during the long years of the Cold War – a shooting match between a member of the Nato alliance and Russia.
Wiser council has prevailed – and perhaps not surprisingly. Turkey depends on Russia for more than half its natural gas supplies and enjoys a thriving commercial relationship with Moscow. Russia, for all its vast geography, cannot send naval ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean without passing through the Bosphorus, a strait controlled by Turkey.
So there are some restraints on an escalation towards a third world war. But that does not make the stand-off between Russia and Turkey any less dangerous for the region.
While the Russians have been shocked and surprised by the Turkish action – comparisons have been made in Moscow with the shooting of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 which set off the First World War – the Turkish media seemed to be expecting it. For the Russians the “provocation” is all on the Turkish side.
To understand how this came about it is best not to be misled by cold war parallels. This is not about two grand alliances facing off. It is about two men. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have much in common: both see themselves as transformative leaders and have come to identify the state with their own person, and are popular with it. By contrast, the American president appears as a transient figure, a mere place holder.
Mr Putin’s forceful entry into the Syrian conflict has clarified the clouded balance of power in the regional conflict over Syria. He is the leader of the Russian-Iranian alliance in support of the failing Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad. Mr Erdogan is the leader of the anti-Assad forces, and Syria is a national priority for him by dint of Turkey’s long border and his clear interests in containing the advance of Kurdish nationalism in Syria. That both these leadership positions are held by non-Arabs is testimony to the divided energies of the Arab world, split between containing the rise of Iran and combating the threat to fragile nation states from jihadist armed groups.
The Russian entry into the conflict has been a bitter blow to Mr Erdogan’s efforts to unseat the Syrian president.
This setback has been compounded by the western acceptance of Russia and Iran as partners in any Syrian peace process, and what appears to be the gradual rehabilitation of Mr Putin after his seizure of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine last year. This has strengthened Russia’s position in the Black Sea to the detriment of Turkey. Strategic loss is made worse by historic memory: Crimea was a Muslim khanate until the 18th century, and in Turkish eyes the peninsula belongs neither to Russia nor Ukraine but to the crushed and dispossessed Crimean Tatar people.
Turkey has responded to renewed peace efforts by grooming one of the major rebel groups, Ahrar Al Sham (“the free men of Syria”), to become the acceptable face of the opposition and an indispensable part of the post-Assad transition. This process is far from complete. While Ahrar Al Sham is a genuine expression of Syrian Islamic-based opposition, it has close links with the local Al Qaeda outfit, Jabhat Al Nusra, which it seems unwilling to sever. This makes it still unacceptable to the Americans. But still there is a clear Turkish strategy here to advance the interests of Ankara’s proxies in the peace talks.
This strategy however is upset by the Russian bombing of rebel movements in northern Syria. While claiming to be attacking ISIL, in fact the majority of hits have been against the rebel movements that oppose ISIL, though in Russian terms they are all “terrorists”.
Most recently the Russians have been bombing ethnic Turkmen villagers north of Aleppo who control a crucial area of the border. This is a red flag for Turkey for three reasons: the Turkmen are ethnic cousins of the Turks so their fate arouses deep popular sympathy; there are fears that the Russian assault aims to force the Turkmen to flee to Turkey; and this could open the way for the regime to return to the border area, or the Kurdish PYD militia to strengthen its position there. Both outcomes would be seen as disastrous in Turkey, depriving it of a supply line to its proxies in Syria.
Mr Putin has described the downing of its bomber as “a stab in the back by the accomplices of terrorists”.
As for Mr Erdogan, he has made clear that the issue is not just about defending air space. Turkey had a right to protect its “brothers and sisters” – as he called the Turkmen minority – across the border, he said.
This was a high-stakes gamble by Mr Erdogan, a riposte to Mr Putin’s entry into the conflict. Feelings are running high in Moscow. Western capitals are relying on Mr Putin to keep the desire for revenge under control. They hope that the less than fulsome support for Turkey from his Nato allies will restrain Mr Erdogan in future.
The world cannot stand many more of these close shaves. France and the US will be trying to hold Mr Putin close, but the prospect of Francois Hollande’s “grand coalition” against ISIL following the Paris bombing and shooting attacks is further away than ever.
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