The End of the UNIFIL: Will a US Veto end the peacekeeping force 25 years after the liberation?
5/26/2025 8:20:07 PM
Elie Al Hindy
As the United Nations Security Council prepares to renew the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in August 2025, all eyes are on Washington. With Donald Trump having returned to the White House, there are compelling reasons to believe that the United States will not support a simple rollover of the current mandate. Instead, the administration is likely to demand sweeping changes to UNIFIL's operational powers, and may veto any resolution that fails to meet those expectations. The crux of the U.S. position will be UNIFIL's ability to effectively enforce the ceasefire agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in November 2024. This anticipated U.S. stance builds on Trump’s first term precedence and on the recent changes in the geopolitics of the region.
During Trump's first term (2017–2021), U.S. diplomats repeatedly criticized UNIFIL for its ineffectiveness in curbing Hezbollah's military entrenchment in southern Lebanon. Ambassador Nikki Haley and her successors, Jonathan Cohen and Kelly Craft, made it clear that Washington was disillusioned with what it saw as a "blindfolded" peacekeeping mission. In 2018, Haley lambasted UNIFIL leadership, saying: “UNIFIL is supposed to stop Hezbollah and other actors from amassing weapons and threatening the region. But it can’t do its job when it’s blindfolded.” In 2020, the U.S. pushed for a troop reduction and greater operational access, even threatening to veto the renewal unless key reforms were adopted.
These demands coalesced into one core message: UNIFIL must have the authority and capability to prevent Hezbollah from turning southern Lebanon into a forward operating base against Israel. The Trump administration at the time advocated for uncoordinated patrols, unrestricted access, and a possible shift in UNIFIL's mandate from a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation to a Chapter VII enforcement mission. Although such a shift never materialized, the political will was evident. As Ambassador Kelly Craft declared in 2020, “Today we halt a long period of Council complacency on UNIFIL and the growing and destabilizing influence of Iran and its client, the terrorist organization Hezbollah.”
Fast forward to 2025. The regional context has changed, but the strategic logic remains and became even more valid. The ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024—brokered after months of cross-border violence—has created a tenuous calm that requires active monitoring and robust enforcement. The agreement clearly stipulated for the complete dismantling of any military presence or infrastructure of Hezbollah starting from the south, and the Lebanese government has clearly committed itself to fully implementing its side of the agreement.
This is precisely where the new Trump administration's approach will come into play. Drawing on the policy blueprint from its previous term, and on the new role of the Quintet committee (headed by an American officer) assigned to observe the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the US is likely to insist that UNIFIL be empowered to enforce the ceasefire, not merely observe it. This would mean granting UNIFIL the authority to conduct weapons inspections, seize unauthorized arms, and detain individuals who violate the terms of the agreement. Such provisions would transform UNIFIL from a passive observer into an active guarantor of peace. The US may even request that a US officer, heading the Quintet or a different one, heads the new enhanced UNIFIL.
Early statements from U.S. officials since January 2025 suggest that Washington is already laying the groundwork for this policy shift. Sources close to the administration have indicated that U.S. Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell is coordinating a diplomatic campaign aimed at redefining UNIFIL's mission. In closed-door Security Council sessions, the U.S. has reportedly signalled that it will oppose any resolution that does not explicitly authorize enforcement measures. As one source close to the administration put it, "UNIFIL needs to be more than a bystander—it must be a deterrent. If it cannot stop Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire, then it should not be there at all." Knowing that even in the previous democratic administration former U.S. Deputy Representative to the UN Richard Mills said in 2022 in a rare moment of bipartisan consistency: “UNIFIL peacekeepers are being blocked, with increasing frequency, from conducting mandated tasks and accessing sites of concern.”
This hardline stance is consistent with Trump's broader foreign policy doctrine: unilateral strength, reduced tolerance for multilateral underperformance, and prioritization of Israeli security interests. The administration’s behaviour also indicates that it is not afraid to act alone or to veto resolutions that contradict its strategic goals.
Of course, such a position is likely to provoke resistance from other permanent members of the Security Council, particularly France and Russia, both of whom have traditionally supported a more cautious approach to UNIFIL's mandate. Lebanon, too, may object to what may be perceived as a violation of its sovereignty and/or a threat to national stability.
However, the Trump administration will argue that the region has closed the page on Iran’s arms and their ability to threaten peace. Furthermore, the administration has proposed in April 2025 eliminating U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping missions, including UNIFIL, citing perceived failures in operations in Mali, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This proposal came as part of a broader plan to slash the State Department's budget by about half and end contributions for international peacekeeping due to what the administration describes as "recent failures in peacekeeping" and a "disproportionately high level of assessments"
Given the fragile post-ceasefire environment, Washington will insist that only a restructured, muscular UNIFIL can fulfil the international community's obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and ensure that the Blue Line does not erupt into a new theatre of war.
Thus, the US position will be either an enhanced UNIFIL or no UNIFIL at all. Unless the mission is endowed with meaningful enforcement powers to uphold the 2024 ceasefire agreement, a U.S. veto in the Security Council is not just possible, it is probable.
The question, then, is what will be Lebanon’s official position in this regard and whether the rest of the international community is prepared to accept this new reality or risk an unravelling of the hard-won calm along the Israel-Lebanon frontier. Will August be the end of the grace period given to the Lebanese government to fulfil its obligations in disarming Hezbollah and monopolising weapons on all its territory?
As the United Nations Security Council prepares to renew the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in August 2025, all eyes are on Washington. With Donald Trump having returned to the White House, there are compelling reasons to believe that the United States will not support a simple rollover of the current mandate. Instead, the administration is likely to demand sweeping changes to UNIFIL's operational powers, and may veto any resolution that fails to meet those expectations. The crux of the U.S. position will be UNIFIL's ability to effectively enforce the ceasefire agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in November 2024. This anticipated U.S. stance builds on Trump’s first term precedence and on the recent changes in the geopolitics of the region.
During Trump's first term (2017–2021), U.S. diplomats repeatedly criticized UNIFIL for its ineffectiveness in curbing Hezbollah's military entrenchment in southern Lebanon. Ambassador Nikki Haley and her successors, Jonathan Cohen and Kelly Craft, made it clear that Washington was disillusioned with what it saw as a "blindfolded" peacekeeping mission. In 2018, Haley lambasted UNIFIL leadership, saying: “UNIFIL is supposed to stop Hezbollah and other actors from amassing weapons and threatening the region. But it can’t do its job when it’s blindfolded.” In 2020, the U.S. pushed for a troop reduction and greater operational access, even threatening to veto the renewal unless key reforms were adopted.
These demands coalesced into one core message: UNIFIL must have the authority and capability to prevent Hezbollah from turning southern Lebanon into a forward operating base against Israel. The Trump administration at the time advocated for uncoordinated patrols, unrestricted access, and a possible shift in UNIFIL's mandate from a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation to a Chapter VII enforcement mission. Although such a shift never materialized, the political will was evident. As Ambassador Kelly Craft declared in 2020, “Today we halt a long period of Council complacency on UNIFIL and the growing and destabilizing influence of Iran and its client, the terrorist organization Hezbollah.”
Fast forward to 2025. The regional context has changed, but the strategic logic remains and became even more valid. The ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024—brokered after months of cross-border violence—has created a tenuous calm that requires active monitoring and robust enforcement. The agreement clearly stipulated for the complete dismantling of any military presence or infrastructure of Hezbollah starting from the south, and the Lebanese government has clearly committed itself to fully implementing its side of the agreement.
This is precisely where the new Trump administration's approach will come into play. Drawing on the policy blueprint from its previous term, and on the new role of the Quintet committee (headed by an American officer) assigned to observe the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the US is likely to insist that UNIFIL be empowered to enforce the ceasefire, not merely observe it. This would mean granting UNIFIL the authority to conduct weapons inspections, seize unauthorized arms, and detain individuals who violate the terms of the agreement. Such provisions would transform UNIFIL from a passive observer into an active guarantor of peace. The US may even request that a US officer, heading the Quintet or a different one, heads the new enhanced UNIFIL.
Early statements from U.S. officials since January 2025 suggest that Washington is already laying the groundwork for this policy shift. Sources close to the administration have indicated that U.S. Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell is coordinating a diplomatic campaign aimed at redefining UNIFIL's mission. In closed-door Security Council sessions, the U.S. has reportedly signalled that it will oppose any resolution that does not explicitly authorize enforcement measures. As one source close to the administration put it, "UNIFIL needs to be more than a bystander—it must be a deterrent. If it cannot stop Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire, then it should not be there at all." Knowing that even in the previous democratic administration former U.S. Deputy Representative to the UN Richard Mills said in 2022 in a rare moment of bipartisan consistency: “UNIFIL peacekeepers are being blocked, with increasing frequency, from conducting mandated tasks and accessing sites of concern.”
This hardline stance is consistent with Trump's broader foreign policy doctrine: unilateral strength, reduced tolerance for multilateral underperformance, and prioritization of Israeli security interests. The administration’s behaviour also indicates that it is not afraid to act alone or to veto resolutions that contradict its strategic goals.
Of course, such a position is likely to provoke resistance from other permanent members of the Security Council, particularly France and Russia, both of whom have traditionally supported a more cautious approach to UNIFIL's mandate. Lebanon, too, may object to what may be perceived as a violation of its sovereignty and/or a threat to national stability.
However, the Trump administration will argue that the region has closed the page on Iran’s arms and their ability to threaten peace. Furthermore, the administration has proposed in April 2025 eliminating U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping missions, including UNIFIL, citing perceived failures in operations in Mali, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This proposal came as part of a broader plan to slash the State Department's budget by about half and end contributions for international peacekeeping due to what the administration describes as "recent failures in peacekeeping" and a "disproportionately high level of assessments"
Given the fragile post-ceasefire environment, Washington will insist that only a restructured, muscular UNIFIL can fulfil the international community's obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and ensure that the Blue Line does not erupt into a new theatre of war.
Thus, the US position will be either an enhanced UNIFIL or no UNIFIL at all. Unless the mission is endowed with meaningful enforcement powers to uphold the 2024 ceasefire agreement, a U.S. veto in the Security Council is not just possible, it is probable.
The question, then, is what will be Lebanon’s official position in this regard and whether the rest of the international community is prepared to accept this new reality or risk an unravelling of the hard-won calm along the Israel-Lebanon frontier. Will August be the end of the grace period given to the Lebanese government to fulfil its obligations in disarming Hezbollah and monopolising weapons on all its territory?