Israeli Officer Reveals New Details of Nasrallah’s Assassination
9/27/2026 12:44:40 PM
An Israeli reserve officer has revealed new details about the airstrike that killed former Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Dahiyeh on September 27, 2024. He said the Israeli military had planned to prevent rescue teams from reaching the site after the bombing, in case Nasrallah had survived and remained trapped under the rubble.
The Jerusalem Post quoted the officer, identified only by the initial “S,” who it said was responsible for managing the target bank in an Air Force unit, as saying that Israeli aircraft dropped 83 bombs on the compound where Nasrallah was located. The details of what happened after the strike are based on the officer’s account, and the newspaper did not independently verify the targeting of rescue vehicles or the number of bombs used.
The officer said that before the operation, he consulted an official from an Israeli rescue unit about how long it would take a professional team to reach people trapped at a site that had suffered a similar level of destruction. According to his account, the estimated time was about six hours, leading him to conclude that access to the site should be prevented for twice that amount of time.
He added that the aim was to ensure Nasrallah’s death, either from the direct impact of the strike or, if he survived it, from blood loss or lack of oxygen while trapped beneath the rubble. This is the most significant detail in the new report, as it concerns what the officer said was part of the operation’s plan after the bombs were dropped, rather than the airstrike itself.
According to the officer, the Israeli military detected a motorcycle arriving in the area after the bombing, along with people attempting to approach the site through a nearby opening. He said a bulldozer later arrived to clear the rubble but came under attack, followed by a second bulldozer that was also targeted.
The accounts cited in the report did not identify the people who attempted to reach the site or the operators of the two bulldozers, nor were the sequence of events independently verified. The details concerning the targeting of the vehicles used to clear the rubble therefore remain attributed to the Israeli officer.
The officer said Israel had monitored Nasrallah for a long time and knew which apartments he stayed in, the places where he sought refuge and locations prepared for use in emergencies. He added that Nasrallah did not spend all his time underground and at times stayed in an apartment on the eighth floor of a residential building in Beirut’s southern suburbs, giving him quick access to a fortified location.
According to his account, the planners had considered targeting Nasrallah in more than one building or shelter, while on the day of his killing, he had access to locations that were “more heavily fortified” than the compound he ultimately went to.
The Jerusalem Post report also examined a series of assassinations targeting Hezbollah field commanders before Nasrallah’s death, arguing that they weakened the group’s leadership network and operational knowledge. Part of the report was based on Lebanese accounts and previous statements, including remarks by Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit chief Wafiq Safa about the impact of the pager explosions on Nasrallah.
The report also cited assessments by Israeli officials that Hezbollah continues to face difficulties rebuilding its leadership and military structure two years later.
The Jerusalem Post quoted the officer, identified only by the initial “S,” who it said was responsible for managing the target bank in an Air Force unit, as saying that Israeli aircraft dropped 83 bombs on the compound where Nasrallah was located. The details of what happened after the strike are based on the officer’s account, and the newspaper did not independently verify the targeting of rescue vehicles or the number of bombs used.
The officer said that before the operation, he consulted an official from an Israeli rescue unit about how long it would take a professional team to reach people trapped at a site that had suffered a similar level of destruction. According to his account, the estimated time was about six hours, leading him to conclude that access to the site should be prevented for twice that amount of time.
He added that the aim was to ensure Nasrallah’s death, either from the direct impact of the strike or, if he survived it, from blood loss or lack of oxygen while trapped beneath the rubble. This is the most significant detail in the new report, as it concerns what the officer said was part of the operation’s plan after the bombs were dropped, rather than the airstrike itself.
According to the officer, the Israeli military detected a motorcycle arriving in the area after the bombing, along with people attempting to approach the site through a nearby opening. He said a bulldozer later arrived to clear the rubble but came under attack, followed by a second bulldozer that was also targeted.
The accounts cited in the report did not identify the people who attempted to reach the site or the operators of the two bulldozers, nor were the sequence of events independently verified. The details concerning the targeting of the vehicles used to clear the rubble therefore remain attributed to the Israeli officer.
The officer said Israel had monitored Nasrallah for a long time and knew which apartments he stayed in, the places where he sought refuge and locations prepared for use in emergencies. He added that Nasrallah did not spend all his time underground and at times stayed in an apartment on the eighth floor of a residential building in Beirut’s southern suburbs, giving him quick access to a fortified location.
According to his account, the planners had considered targeting Nasrallah in more than one building or shelter, while on the day of his killing, he had access to locations that were “more heavily fortified” than the compound he ultimately went to.
The Jerusalem Post report also examined a series of assassinations targeting Hezbollah field commanders before Nasrallah’s death, arguing that they weakened the group’s leadership network and operational knowledge. Part of the report was based on Lebanese accounts and previous statements, including remarks by Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit chief Wafiq Safa about the impact of the pager explosions on Nasrallah.
The report also cited assessments by Israeli officials that Hezbollah continues to face difficulties rebuilding its leadership and military structure two years later.