NOW
The Middle East may call its uprisings the Arab Spring, but Washington probably sees them as mere upheavals. The United States is not trying to help Arabs build democracies to replace the deposed autocrats, but is rather searching for military juntas to hold the levers of power, next to ceremonial, non-functional, hodge-podge governments that include everyone who is anyone.
In May, while Congress was up in arms over Egypt's prison sentences against 43 NGO workers (including Americans), Secretary of State John Kerry quietly waived restrictions on $1.3 billion USD in aid to Egypt, according to The Daily Beast.
Kerry's memo reasoned that this "Foreign Military Financing" contributed to supporting U.S. national security interests, which he outlined as follows: "[S]topping the movement of illicit goods across Egyptian borders, increasing security in the Sinai, helping prevent attacks from Gaza into Israel, countering terrorism, and securing transit through the Suez Canal, [in addition to] over flight privileges extended by Egypt [to] our military."
Kerry's aid to Egypt, or more specifically to its military, was not conditional on the reversal of articles in the new Egyptian constitution that limit freedom of speech or undermine women's rights, like during the Bush years. America's aid is now focused on "military-to-military ties, a strong US security partnership with Egypt [that] maintains a channel to Egyptian military leadership, who are key opinion makers."
So not only does America believe its interests should be protected by the military while Egyptians revolt and counter revolt, Washington also thinks it is all right for the army to influence politics as "opinion makers," and still get paid for it.
America's revived fascination with military-to-military ties is now dominating its foreign policy toward the Middle East.
In Jordan, the United States conducted joint military exercises and left behind a detachment of F-16s and Patriot missiles. In Iraq and Lebanon, U.S. Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey suggested that Washington send trainers to help prepare both countries face spillover contingencies from Syria.
America's infatuation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), in particular, raises an eyebrow.
Historically, Lebanese politicians kept the army weak for fear that it might attempt a takeover, like in other Arab countries. But after the civil war, and under Hafez al-Assad's occupation, the Lebanese Army was rebuilt in the image of its Syrian counterpart. When Bashar al-Assad took over the 'Lebanese file' in 1998, he started propping up officers and using them as his protégés to rival establishment figures such as late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.
Emile Lahoud, Jamil Sayyed, Mustafa Hamdan, and a host of other LAF officers - suspected of embezzling public funds and being involved in Hariri's murder - were all LAF, whose leadership, and that of the Intelligence Directorate attached to it, were handpicked by Damascus.
After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Assad handed over the keys to the LAF and the Intelligence Directorate to Hezbollah, who not only started staffing its leadership with loyalists and close allies, but is believed to have taken out the unruly officers like assassinated General François Hajj.
Since then, and except for its 2007 war with Fatah al-Islam, the LAF has always behaved according to Hezbollah's whims, staying on the sidelines when the party's thugs swept Beirut in May 2008. The LAF even participated in the killing of Hezbollah's rivals, as in the case of the two sheikhs in the north and the siege of Arsal, all while conspicuously sparing the Hezbollah militia and its allies.
The U.S., which until recently was reluctant in arming the LAF for fear that arms might fall into the hands of Hezbollah, seems to have thrown caution to the wind and fully endorses the Lebanese Army today.
During the recent Sidon clashes, the army - some say jointly with Hezbollah - took on the party's nemesis Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir and his armed gang. Washington was head-over-heels in its support of the army, even though neither Assir nor his group are on America's terrorism list. Assir only commanded an armed organization in a country that hosts dozens of militias of all sizes.
Even worse, Washington did not ask that any investigation be conducted into what prompted the LAF-Assir war, or cared that Hezbollah fighters were also involved. Washington did not care either that the LAF was acting independently of civilian authorities.
The Obama administration's unqualified infatuation with Arab armies has become flagrant. Perhaps that is why U.S. officials repeatedly say they wish a military coup in Syria could take out Assad and maybe sponsor the imagined "all inclusive government" and democracy thereafter.
But if the military is the way forward, why ask Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi to leave? Both were military men, and if strong armies are what the Arab Spring needs, why replace the reigning generals?
Maybe Washington really works in mysterious ways.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
In May, while Congress was up in arms over Egypt's prison sentences against 43 NGO workers (including Americans), Secretary of State John Kerry quietly waived restrictions on $1.3 billion USD in aid to Egypt, according to The Daily Beast.
Kerry's memo reasoned that this "Foreign Military Financing" contributed to supporting U.S. national security interests, which he outlined as follows: "[S]topping the movement of illicit goods across Egyptian borders, increasing security in the Sinai, helping prevent attacks from Gaza into Israel, countering terrorism, and securing transit through the Suez Canal, [in addition to] over flight privileges extended by Egypt [to] our military."
Kerry's aid to Egypt, or more specifically to its military, was not conditional on the reversal of articles in the new Egyptian constitution that limit freedom of speech or undermine women's rights, like during the Bush years. America's aid is now focused on "military-to-military ties, a strong US security partnership with Egypt [that] maintains a channel to Egyptian military leadership, who are key opinion makers."
So not only does America believe its interests should be protected by the military while Egyptians revolt and counter revolt, Washington also thinks it is all right for the army to influence politics as "opinion makers," and still get paid for it.
America's revived fascination with military-to-military ties is now dominating its foreign policy toward the Middle East.
In Jordan, the United States conducted joint military exercises and left behind a detachment of F-16s and Patriot missiles. In Iraq and Lebanon, U.S. Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey suggested that Washington send trainers to help prepare both countries face spillover contingencies from Syria.
America's infatuation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), in particular, raises an eyebrow.
Historically, Lebanese politicians kept the army weak for fear that it might attempt a takeover, like in other Arab countries. But after the civil war, and under Hafez al-Assad's occupation, the Lebanese Army was rebuilt in the image of its Syrian counterpart. When Bashar al-Assad took over the 'Lebanese file' in 1998, he started propping up officers and using them as his protégés to rival establishment figures such as late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.
Emile Lahoud, Jamil Sayyed, Mustafa Hamdan, and a host of other LAF officers - suspected of embezzling public funds and being involved in Hariri's murder - were all LAF, whose leadership, and that of the Intelligence Directorate attached to it, were handpicked by Damascus.
After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Assad handed over the keys to the LAF and the Intelligence Directorate to Hezbollah, who not only started staffing its leadership with loyalists and close allies, but is believed to have taken out the unruly officers like assassinated General François Hajj.
Since then, and except for its 2007 war with Fatah al-Islam, the LAF has always behaved according to Hezbollah's whims, staying on the sidelines when the party's thugs swept Beirut in May 2008. The LAF even participated in the killing of Hezbollah's rivals, as in the case of the two sheikhs in the north and the siege of Arsal, all while conspicuously sparing the Hezbollah militia and its allies.
The U.S., which until recently was reluctant in arming the LAF for fear that arms might fall into the hands of Hezbollah, seems to have thrown caution to the wind and fully endorses the Lebanese Army today.
During the recent Sidon clashes, the army - some say jointly with Hezbollah - took on the party's nemesis Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir and his armed gang. Washington was head-over-heels in its support of the army, even though neither Assir nor his group are on America's terrorism list. Assir only commanded an armed organization in a country that hosts dozens of militias of all sizes.
Even worse, Washington did not ask that any investigation be conducted into what prompted the LAF-Assir war, or cared that Hezbollah fighters were also involved. Washington did not care either that the LAF was acting independently of civilian authorities.
The Obama administration's unqualified infatuation with Arab armies has become flagrant. Perhaps that is why U.S. officials repeatedly say they wish a military coup in Syria could take out Assad and maybe sponsor the imagined "all inclusive government" and democracy thereafter.
But if the military is the way forward, why ask Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi to leave? Both were military men, and if strong armies are what the Arab Spring needs, why replace the reigning generals?
Maybe Washington really works in mysterious ways.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
